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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1973

Misc. No.

GREGORY HESS, Appellant

v.
STATE OF INDIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant appeals from the Indiana Supreme Court's affirmance of the
judgment of the Monroe Superior Court which affirmed, upon trial de novo,
his conviction for disorderly conduct entered by the City Court of
Bloomington, Indiana.

He submits this statement to show that the Supreme

Court of the United States has jurisdiction of the appeal and that the
questions presented by the appeal are substantial.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Indiana is reported in 297 N.E. 2d
413 and at 36 Ind. Dec. 527.

The Monroe Superior Court and the City Court

of Bloomington did not file written opinions.

The opinion of the Supreme

Court of Indiana is attached in the appendix hereto.
JURISDICTION
This suit originates as a state court criminal proceeding pursuant to
Ind. Code 1971, 35-27-2-1, Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann., 1972 Supp., Sec. 10-1510,
despite appellant's challenge that the statute violates the United States
Constitution on its face and as applied to him in this case.

The judgment of

affirmance was entered by the · Supreme Court of Indiana on 22 May 1973, and
notice of appeal was filed in that court on 8 June 1973.

The jurisdiction

of the United States Supreme Court to hear this appeal is conferred by
Title128, United States Code, Section 1257(2).
STATUTE INVOLVED
The Supreme Court of Indiana sustained the validity of Ind. Code 1971,
35-27-2-1, Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann., 1972 Supp., Sec. 10-1510, which provides:
Whoever shall act in a loud, boisterous or disorderly
manner so as to disturb the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or family, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultuous or
offensive behavior, threatening, traducing, quarreling,
challenging to fight or fighting, shall be deemed guilty of
disorderly conduct, and upon conviction, shall be fined in
any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) to which
may be added imprisonment for not to exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Is the Indiana Disorderly Conduct Statute, on its face and as construed
by the Indiana Supreme Court, so vague that it denies due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment?

Is the Indiana Disorderly Conduct Statute,

on its face and as construed by the Indiana Supreme Court, void for its
overbreadth in prohibiting expression protected by the First, and Fourteenth
Amendments?

Is the Indiana Disorderly Conduct Statute unconstitutional

under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as applied to the words spoken
by appellant?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted of disorderly conduct, based solely upon words
spoken in connection with law enforcement activities responding to a demonstration in which there is no evidence defendant participated.

On 13 May 1970,

certain persons conducted a demonstration on the campus of Indiana University,
Bloomington, protesting United States involvement in the war in Indochina.
Local law enforcement officials, including the Sheriff of Monroe County,
assisted Indiana University officials in restoring access to a University
building.

Two arrests were made by city police officers; 100 to 150 spectators

then entered an adjacent public street in front of the police vehicle containing the arrested demonstrators.

To clear the street for automobile

traffic, the Sheriff and his deputies walked through the street; those in
the street left it to join spectators along both sides.
The appellant was standing off the street on the side of the administration building, now cleared of any obstructions.
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As the Sheriff passed, he

heard appellant use the word "fuck" in a loud voice and arrested him.
The appellant was tried in City Court, convicted of disorderly conduct,
and fined twenty-five dollars.

The conviction was appealed for trial de

novo to the Monroe Superior Court, based upon a stipulation of facts.

It

was stipulated that Hess used either the phrase "We'll take the fucking
street later," or "We'll take the fucking street again."

It was stipulated

that the Sheriff testified in City Court that he was offended by the appellant's
expression, and that he did not interpret the expression as being directed
personally at him.

It was also stipulated that two witnesses in the innnediate

but not any i.ouder: t:t1an the other persons around them; that they were not
offended by the appellant's use of the word "fucking" and that many other
people in the crowd were using that and similar words before and after
appellant's arrest; that appellant did not appear to be exhorting the crowd
to go back into the street; that he was facing the crowd, not the street,
when he spoke and that his statement did not appear to be addressed to any
particular person or group.

Finally, it was stipulated that,an expert wit-

A

ness on English slang usage testified, among other things, that he did not
believe the appellant's expression would have been offensive to personw in
the crowd in front of the administration building in the particular circumstances, that the use of such an expression may function as a safety valve
to avoid violent behavior, and that the use of the phrase may have signified
group identification and opposition to the actions of the Sheriff.
The Monroe Superior Court convicted the appellant of disorderly conduct,
imposing a fine of one dollar.

Upon appellant's motion for clarification

of judgment, the Court ruled that the statement "has a tendency to lead to
violence and is in violation of the disorderly conduct statute of the State
of Ind.iana regardless of whether or not the vulgar modifier was used in said
statement."

(Record, p. 39.)

The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the conviction, ruling that this
Court's opinion in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), revised the
clear-and-present-danger test to require only a "tendency to lead to violence."
The Indiana Disorderly Conduct Statute, which had previously been constru.e d
to · reqUire a "tendency to lead to violence" was therefore not overbroad or
vague and the appellant's speech, even if the word "fucking" were "stricken
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from the evidence" violated the statute.
Method of Presenting the Federal Question.

Appellant moved to quash

the affidavit for disorderly conduct in city court on grounds, among others,
that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution (Record, p. 7), supported by a memorandum of points and
authorities (Record, p. 9).
side.)

The motion was denied.

(Record, p. i, reverse

Before the Monroe Superior Court, appellant incorporated the earlier

memorandum by reference (Record, p. 20) and added further argument that
-the statute was applied unconstitutionally to the appellant (Record, p. 21).
Before the Supreme Court of Indiana, appellant's brief had the following
. headings:

"Section 10-1510 is Unconstitutional As Applied to the Appellant"

(Appellant's Brief, p. 18) and "Section 10-1510 is Unconstitutional On Its
Face Because of Vagueness and Overbreadth" (Appellant's Brief, p. 31).
arguments were directly rejected by the Indiana Supreme Court.

These

An additional

challenge to the charging affidavit under Indiana law was not passed on below
and is not presented by this appeal.

THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL
The constitutionality of disorderly conduct statutes is of great importance in the day-to-day administration of the American judicial system.
drunkenness arrests annually outnumber arrests for disorderly conduct.

Only
FBI

Uniform Crime Reports, 1970, p. 119 (of the total estimated arrests for 1970,
710,000 were for disorderly conduct).

These everyday problems have been of

real concern to federal courts, a number of which have recently found statutes
like the one involved in this appeal unconstitutional.

Gardner v. Ceci,

312 F.Supp. 516 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Pritikin v. Thurman, 311 F.Supp. 1400 (S.D.
Fla. 1970); Original Fayette County League v. Ellington, 309 F.Supp. 96 (E.D.
Tenn. 1970); Livingston v. Garmire, 308 F.Supp. 472 (S.D. Fla. 1970); Carmichael v . Allen, 267 F.Supp. 985 (D. Ga. 1967).

This appeal presents not

only the risks of discretionary police power being used to induce "hushed,
suffocating silence," Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164
(1972), under a statute of airy generality, but the perhaps more ominous
threat of police empowered to arrest citizens who stand in public places
making artless but strong remarks to their fellows.
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1.

Vagueness.

The Indiana statute defines at least forty-eight

permutations which violate it.
( dissenting opinion).

Hess v. State, 297 N.E. 2d 413, 417, 424 n.l

Any person, for example, who "s'tiall act in a.

d isord e rl y manner so as to disturb the peace and quiet , of any neighborhood
by unusua l noise" (emphasis added) violates the act.

~o "semantical scalpel,"

Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528, 529 (Burger, C.J,~, dissenting) (1972),
is needed to show that a person of ordinary intelligence could only guess at
what wouid trigger the state's retribution.

Is it "disorderly" to be drunk,

or transfused by ecstasy, or illogical in speech?
or George III ? )

(Or to dislike the Sheriff

Is it "unusual ]'.J.Oise" to, walk through the streets of a

college town reciting Homer in Greek or praising the government of China?
(Or South Vietnam?)

"Political campaigns, athletic events, public meetings,

and a host of other activities ,produce loud, confused or senseless shouting
not in accord with facts, trutp or right procedure to say nothing of not in
accord with propriety, modesty;,' good taste or good manµers.

The happy

i

cacophony of democracy would be stilled if all 'improper noises' in the
'

i

I

normal meaning of the term were suppressed."

Landry v. Daley, 280 F.Supp.

968, 970 (N.D. Ill., 1968), r~versed on other grounds, sub . ~ - Boyle v.
Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
j

Two other terms in the statute cr:e ate dangers of risk like those which
.

[

this Court has recently found i unacceptable.

The Indiana statute's use of

I
"disturb" seems equivalent to/ the word "annoy," of whifh this Court recently
i

!

said:
If three or more peopl~ meet together on a sidew~lk or street
corner, they must condudt themselves so as not to '< annoy any
police officer or other /person w~o should happen ~o pass by.
i

:

'
Conduct that annoysI some pebple
does not annoy others.
Thus, the ordinance is ~ague, no~ in the sense that it requires
a person to conform his / conduct /to an imprecise but comprehensible
normative standard, but/ rather :i;n the sense that no standard of
conduct is specified at! all. C~ates v. City of Cip.cinnati, · 402
U.S. 611, 614 (1971). 1
/

Furthermore, the term "neighborhood" is not defined, and indeed was
in t his case apparently sufficiently general to include a public street
adj acent to a university campus.

In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.

lOLi-, 109 (1972), this Court found it a "close" questiop. whether a statute was
\

unco n stitutionally vague for prohibiting disturbing the peace of a school
ses s ion.

That statute was redeemed, in the Court's view, by its specific
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limi tations of time and place.

The phrase "neighborhood," however, offers

n o compara ble limitations.
The opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court in this case states two cons tructions which, it concludes, remedy these vices.

First, the statute

is c on s trued to apply only to speech which has a ''tendency to lead to viol enc e ."

But as Mr. Justice Black observed in a passage recently quoted with

a pproval by this Court, Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 527 (1972):

"(H]ow

in f initely more doubtful and uncertain are the boundaries of an offense inelud ing any 'diversion tending to a breach of the peace'.

II

Cit y of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 119 (1969) (concurring opinion).

Gregory v.
Even if

the phrase "tendency to lead to violence" had a definite meaning, it would
sti l l not define an offense unless the other terms of the statute (e.g.,
d isorde rl y or neighborhood) were applicable; it does not, however, illuminate
the meaning of those terms.

Appellant's principal objection to the "tendency"

r e formulation is developed in the next section of this statement.
The second limiting construction in this case is . suggested in the following pa ssage from the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion:
In the case at bar we have already pointed out tpat appellant
cl ea rl y brought himself within the statute in that his speech and
conduct was offensive behavior, threatening, traducing and
cha lleng ing the police officers. Other conduct such as the
utt e ring or causing of loud and unusual noises must be such as
to disrupt the peaceful character of the neighborhood to an extent that it becomes a public nuisance. 297 N.E. 2d at 416.
The "public nuisance" limitation fails to clarify the statute for three reasons.
First, the phrase "nuisance" is sureiy not used in the
technical legal sense
,:
of , for example, operating a tannery in a residential neighborhood.

It must,

i ns t ead, mean something little different from the "anp,oyance" which rendered
v ague the ordinance in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, ;~02 U.S. 611 (1971).
Second, there is no suggestion that the phrase "public nuisance" is used as
Mr. Justice Powell used it in Rosenfeld v. New Jersey·, 408 U.S. 901 (1972)
i

(d issenting opinion), to define "a verbal assault on . an unwilling audience."
Third, the limiting construction does not apply to "gffensive behavior,
th rea ten ing , traducing and challenging" -- words who ~~ already vague meanings
are mystically clouded by their application in this ~ase to words not spoken
to t he police, not soliciting a fight, not inciting qr causing violence,
{:"

a nd not out of keeping with language already used by,others at the scene.

II
:i..

Cnnf:lict between thd stntutc and the First Amendment.
!

The Indiana

i

pro hi.bi ts speech pro 9ected by / the First Amendment, made applicable
!
i
to the states by the Fourteelth Amendrent. The construction given the
:~t:;1 t ute

·

I

·I

statute by the Indiana Su~re~e Court ln ' this case and an earlier decision,
i

.

I

l~1 i ted v. , State, 269 N.E~ 2d l l49 (197f~ does not remedy the defect.
.

This Court has recently/ reviewe~ the limited circumstances in which
I
governmental interests in the
maintertance
of public order may outweigh the
I
'
I
i
individual's right of free ~peech. As summarized in Cohen v. California,

I

4 0 .)..,

u. s .

1

·1s (1971) , one may /not
·

h e sa_ys unless i t :

;

be sulb·Jecte
· d

(1) is ~ bscene;

I

· · 1 sanction
·
f or wh at
to cr1.m1.na

(2) amounts to fighting words within

the meaning of Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942);
"substantial privacy interests .

(3) invades

in an essentially intolerable manner.

II

;,

403 U.S. at 21; or (4) advocates law violation or use of force

and "is

directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless ac;ion and is likely to
,.
incite or produce such action • • • . " Brandenburg v. ;.· ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) • .
The Cohen case itself establishes that speech is'not obscene merely
i

bec a use of the use of any particular epithet; indeed, the Indiana Supreme
Court in this case was explicit that the word "fucking" was not the basis of
conviction.

297 N.E. 2d at 415. i

The Cohen case similarly closes the possibility that the Indiana statute
I

could be sustained on the basis of the fighting-words exception.

There is no

requirement in the statute, nor was it construed to require, that the words
be "directed to the person of the hearer," Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
2 96, 309 (1940), nor is any showing required (or made in this case) that
anyone present •~as in fact violently aroused or that appellant intended
such a result."

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 20.

Similarly this case does not present a statute limited to "a verbal
assault on an unwilling audience," Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901
(Pow ell, J., dissenting) (1972); the statute was in this case necessarily con1

strued to apply to words spoken out-of-~oors in a public place to an audience
of which other members used similar expressions at th~, time.
The Indiana Supreme Court seems .to have based its conclusion on the risks
_\·;

of violence, sustaining the constitutionality of the ~tatute as limited to
s peech having a "tendency to lead to violence."

This \ conclusion is not only

inconsistent with Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1912), but also rests on the
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significantly incorrect premise that this Court's decision in Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), so revised th~ clear-and-present-danger
test as to make unnecessary any showi'ng that the risk ·of violence is
im;ninent.

That the failure to include a requirement of immediacy in the

possibly resulting unlawful conduct is more than a linguistic quibble with
the Indiana Supreme Court's construct'ion is exactly illustrated by the
s t~1tute' s application to the appellan't -- who did not say "Take the street
11

~

but predicted that it would be taken later (or again).

The speech for

which appellant was convicted was ("on its face and as applied") neither
an

'

incitement to do the act nor a stimulus to act without contemplation

and the passage of time.

"[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed

clear and present, unless the inciden.ce of the evil apprehended is so
imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion."
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (1927).
The Indiana statute, as construed, is not limited to situations in which an
"immediate violent response," Gooding v. Wilson, 408 U.S. 518, 528 (1972)
is likely to result, but prohibits any speech which tends to violence.
Napoleon Bonaparte is said to have heard the tumbrils of the French Revolution prematurely in the Marriage of Figaro's glorification of the servant
class, just as Uncle Tom's Cabin may have fired illegal acts by abolitionists.
To prohibit the government from punishing words whose tendency leads to
violence does not leave the state powerless to employ narrowly drawn laws
against incitement or urging or words designed to fuel hot tempers in the
instant of action; the Indiana Disorderly Conduct Statute is not such a law.
3.

The statute is unconstitutional as applied to appellant's speech.

The previous sections of this statement have attempted to show that the
statute involved is unconstitutional.,

The purpose of this section is to

, ' •
h at appe 11 ant is
. not int~
.
h 1 position
.
. ht s
1
1 .
ma~e
paint
o f re 1 ying
on th e . rig

'
of others who might be affected, but has
himself been found a criminal for
i
saying what a United States citizen has· a right to sa¥.
i

i

'

I

Whatever the aesthetics or ideolo!gy of appellant !? words, the trial and
1

I

!

i

appellate court made explicit/ that the term "fucking" r7as not the basis of

i

!

i

I

conviction, as, of course, Coren v. c1lifornia, 403 u!·s. 15 (1971), left
i
i .
them no choice to do. Nor w~re appellant's words directed to the Sheriff,
or to insult any other perso1 present/
i

I

I

I

'

Those assembl~d by the street were not

a captive audience and the a~pellant'~ voice was no lquder than that of many
~ .-

others present; the neighborbiood, if that vague term defines a street and

. I

·/
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;<

un i v e rsity administration building, was disturbed long before appellant
spoke .

The greater irony of this prosecution, however, is that appellant's
word s seem more a counsel of moderation than present illegality.

To a demon-

s trative crowd which has just been removed from a street -- and appellant
wa s shown by the record to have been facing the crowd -- a reminder that
t he str e et could be taken later (or again) cools thoughtless ardor to
r es i s t pr e sent efforts to clear the ~treet,

Such counsels are no doubt

i nc onsist e nt with police ideology, which might prefer an immediate and conclusive pitched battle over the rights to the street.

But one purpose of

fr ee expression in a republic which respects the minds of its members is
furtherance of untrammeled discussion, even advocacy (distinct from present
i ncitement), of future unlawful resistance to what the govern~ent's officers
do .

The faith of those who adopted our Constitution, prophetic but like

mos t prophecies ever in need of affirmation for a world that fears them no
l onger op e rational, was that citizens would reject diqorder if (but only if)
given time to ponder -- and discuss freely -- the alt~rnatives.
\~·<

Reversing

this decision would attest that faith, since the record does not show that
the contested street was taken later (or again).

Respectfully submitted,

Patrick Louis Baude
Cciunsel for Appellant
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APPENDIX
A copy of the order of affirmance and accompanying opinions in the
Supreme Court of Indiana, dated 22 May.1973.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

GREGORY HESS,

)
Appellant,

v.

)
)
)

)

NO. 1271 S 372

)

STATE OF INDIANA~

)

Appel lee.

)
)

APPEAL FROM THE MONROE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable James M. Dixon, Judge

GIVAN, Jo
This is an appeal by Gregory Hess from a conviction .£cir
disorderly conduct.

Hess was tried in City Court of Bloomington

without a jury and found guilty.

He appealed and the cause

was tra~sferred to the Monrpe Superior Court for a trial de
novo.

The cause was submitted upon stipulated facts.

H~ss

was again found guilty and assessed a fine of one dollar.
The stipulation to the evidence discloses the following:
Early in the afternoon of May 13, 1970, units of the
Monroe County Sheriff's Department and the Bloomington City
Police were summoned to aid Indiana University officials and
campus police in removing certain demonstrators who had been
blocking the doors of Bryan Hall in conjunction with protests
against the war in Indochina"

At that time there were some

200 to 300 persons assembled in front of the Hall.

In the course

of the police activity, two of the demonstrators w2re placed und2r

arrest and put in a patrol car, at which time 100 to 150 of the
persons present we~t into the street in front of the Hall in an
effort to block the progress of the patrol car.

Ic was then

necessary for the police officers to clear the street of such
persons to permit the passage of the car.

When they did not res-

pond to the verbal directions of the police, it was necessa~y
for the officers to forcefully remove the persons from the street.
While in the process of removing the demonstrators from the
street, Monroe County Sheriff Thrasher heard appellant say in a
loud voice, while in a position with his back to the police and
facing the bulk of the demonstrators, one of the followi.ng two
phrases:

"We'll take the fucking street later," or "We'll take
Two female witnesses heard appellant

the fucking street again."

use the phrase in a loud voice but testified that he did no~
appear to be exhorting the crowd to go back into the street.

Appellant first argues that IC 1971 35-27-2-1, BURNS'
IND. STATo ANN.» 1972 Supp.~
as applied in this caseo

§

10-1510~ is unconstitutional

The statute in question provides as

Wboever shall act in a loud, boisterous or disorderly manner so as to disturb the peace and quiet
of any neighborhood or family, by loud or unusual
noise, or by tumultuous or offensive behavior,
threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to
fight or fighting, shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct, and upon conviction, shall be
fined in any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars
[$500] to which may be added imprisonment for not
to exceed one _hundred eighty [180) days.
[Acts
1943> ch. 243, § 1~ p. 685; 1969, ch. 161, § 1,
po 329.]' 1
11

It is appellantes co~tention that as he was exer~ising his right
of free speech, the statute cannot be applied to him, unless his
speech:

(1)

is obscene within the standard of Roth v. Uni:ed

States (1957), 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1304~ l L. EJ. 2d 1495;

(2) amounts to fighting words within the meaning of Chaolinskv
v. New Hamoshire (1942)~ 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766) 86 L. Ed.

1031; (3)

amounts to a public nuisance in that privacy interests

2

are invaded; or (4)

advocates law violation or use of force and

is directed to produce imminent lawless action and is likely to
do so.

Cohen v. California (1971), 403 U.S. 15, 91

s. cc.

1780,

29 L. Ed. 2d 284.
Focusing on the last of these criteria, appellant argues
that the State did not show a

11

clear and present dange:::- 11 of

Terminiello v. City of Chicag~ (1949), 337 U.S. 1,

violence.

69 S . Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed. 1131.

The Supreme Court has recencly

revised its formula for determining when a statute infringes

In Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)~

upon the right of free speech.

395 U.S. 444, 447-448, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 1829~ •

23 L.Ed. 2d

430, 434, the Court said:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a State to forbid
or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is ,
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such
action."
11

In Whited v. State (1971),

--Ind. --

~

269 N.E. 2d 149~ 152~ 25

Ind. Dec. 438~ 442J this Court followed a similar concept requiring a

11

tendency to lead to violence.io

In the case at bar~ in light of the immediately preceding
illegal conduct of the group in blocking traffic, the calling
in a loud voice to those already emotionally upset that they
will repeat the same illegal acts of blocking traffic is
certainly a threat an~ a challenge to fight the police who
are then in the street attempting to maintain order.

The

statement of appellant surpassed the theoretical advocation

of violence, Noto v. United States (1961), 367 U.S. 290, 81

S. Ct . 1517, 6 L. Ed. 2d 836 .

The trial court was justified in

finding that the statement was intended to incite further
lawless action on the part of the crowd in the vicinity or
appellant and was likely to produce such action.

Appellant also argues that the record is devoid of any

3

evid2nce that could serve to bring appellant's conduct within
any permissible application of the statute.
appellant contends that:

In this argument

(1) he spoke no more 16udly than others

at the scene;(2) the neighborhood was disturbed before he
spoke;(3) his words were not offensive; and(4) his language
did not constitute "fighting words."

That others were acting

in a loud manner and that the area was already disturbed are
of no import.

The participation of others relates only to

their guilt, not to the appellant!s. Although the vocabulary
appellant used was tasteless and moronic, -it has nothing to do
with whether the evidence shows disorderly conduct.

If the word

is stricken from the evidence, the record still abundantly
supports the finding of the trial court.

As above noted under

the circumstances, the trial court was justified in finding
that appellant 1 s statement did violate the statute.
Appellant next argues that IC 1971 35-27-2-1, BUR.i.~S'
IND. STAT. A~TN"

~

1972 Supp.

as overbroad and vague.

P.

§

10-1510, is unconstitutional

Although the doctrines are often joined

in discussion~ they are distinct.

This Court has previously

held that a statute is not unconstitutional as vague if it
is capable of intelligent construction and interpretation
by persons who possess only ordinary comprehension, if its
language conveys an adequate description of the prohibited
evil.

Stanley v. State (1969)~ 252 Ind. 37» 245 N.E. 2d 149,

16 Ind. Dec. 662.

.

Words such as

II

loud ' 11 "unusual , II and

"offensive" are relative terms and are

t.o

be interpreted by an

ordinary man under the circumstances with which he is faced.
See Whited v. State (1971), _ _Ind. _ _ » 269 N.E. 2d 149,
25 Ind. Dec. 438.

The statute must be construed as a whole;

thG words cannot be seen to exist in a vacuum.
(1972)~

·--Ind. -- ,

Cheaney v. Stace

285 N.E. 2d 265, 32 Ind. Dec. 42.

In the

case at bar we have already pointed out that the appellant clearly

4

brought himself within the statute in that his speech and conduct
was offensive behavior, threatening, traducing and challenging
the police officers.

Other conduct such as the uttering or

causing of loud and unusual noises mus~ be such as to disrupt
the peaceful character of the neighborhood to an extent, that it
becomes a public nuisance.

With the above in mind, it cannot be

said that an ordinary individual would not have fair notice as
to what is permissible or not permissible under the statute.
A penal statute is overbroad if its sane tions are app lica·b le

to activities that are protected by the constitution.
v. State (1972), _ _Ind. _ _

j

Grody

278 N.E. 2d 280, 29 Ind. Dec. 214.

Appellant argues that his right to free speech is curtailed
by the statute in question.

This Court has previously held,

howeve~ that in cases of pure speech, this statute can only be
applied if the speech has a tendency to lead to violence.
Whited, supra; Miller v. State (1972),
222, 29 Ind. ·nee. 398.

--Ind. --,

279 N.E. 2d

Thus interpreted, the statute does not

infringe upon the right to free speech, and is not overbroad.
Appellant lastly argues that the form affidavit usea
failed to give him notice of the charge against him.

Appellant

filed a motion to quash in the city court where it was overruled.
Apparently, a new motion to quash was not filed in Superior
Court.

The record does show as part of the Statement of the

Case on Appeal from City C~urt the following:
11 The
issues raised on this appeal are as follows:
1. Whether the judge of the City Court erred in
overruling defendant's motion to quash the affidavit . . • . 11

The Superior Court did not understand that statement to serve
as a refiling, apparently, for there is no ruling on the
motion.

Appeals from justice of the peace courts and ci.ty

courts to the circuit or superior courts have long been
recognized as trials de nova.

They are not a review of

the proceedings had before the inferior court.

5

Hensley v.

State

(1969), 251 Ind. 633, 244 N.E. 2d 225, 16 Ind. Dec. 479.

Thus, no issue is presented for this Court's consideration.
The trial court is affirmed.

ARTERBURN, C.J., concurs;
PRENTICE, J., concurs with opinion in which DeBRULER, J.,
concurs;
HUNTER~ J., dissents with opinion.
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Dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent.

Neither my reading

of the facts nor my understanding of First Amendment, and
cases interpreting the F:i.rst Amendment~ coincide with that of
the majority.
First» it is necessary to state where I believe the
majority has misconstrued the record.

The majority states

that when the demonstrators failed to clear the street at the
verbal direction of the police, it was necessary for the
officers to forcefully remove them.

However, there is no

indication in the record that physical force was required.

The

record does say, and I quote:
"When they [the demonstrators in the street]
did not respond to verbal directions, Sheriff
Thrasher and his deputies began walking nort:h
on Indiana Avenue frora 4th Street tow2.rd Kirk'\,'uod
Avenue. to clear the street for automobile traffic.
The persons who were in the strceL then moved
to the curbs on either side of Indiana Avenue,
joining the large number of specta~ors that had
gathered along both sides of the street."

Neither in this statement nor anywhere else in
the record is there any evidence that the police were required to use force to clear the street.
The majority goes on to·say that appellant was
arrested when the sheriff heard him .say either:

11

We'll take

the fucking street later»" or "We'll take the fucking street
again.vv

However, the record says:
"According to Sheriff Thrasher, he heard Hess
use the word "fuck" in a loud voice and he
immediately arrested him for disorderly conduct.
He said that this was the first .::ime he had
.heard that word used on the particular occasion."

Although it was later established in court that appellant did
say one of the above described phrases, ~here is no evidence
in the record that the officers heard the entire: phrase.

The

evidence shows only that Sheriff Thrasher heard appellant use
the offensive word and arrested appellant for using that offensive
word.

The evidence showed that others were using similarly

distasteful modifiers, but that the people in the crowd were
not offended by the foul language"
As to the law, the majority is confused.

They state

that Brandenburg has modified the "clear and present danger"
test established in Terminiello.

A reading of the two te.s;::s

indicates that they are practically synonomous.

Brandenburg

protects the advocacy of law violation "except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action."
added) 395 U. S. at 447.

The word

11

(Emphasis

imminent 11 is defined as

''ready to take place; near at hand; impending; hanging threateningly over one's head; menacingly near."
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Webster 1 s Third

International Dictionary.

It thus seems clear that Brance~burg

did not modify the "clear and present danger" test, but merely
stated it another way.
The majority then holds that the test established
in Whited (with pure speech there must be a "tendency to lead
to violence") is the same test as Brandenburg.
not the case.

This is siwp~y

Brandenburg would require that ~he speech be likely

to lead to imminent or immediate violence.

Requiring only a

tendency and not requiring some immediate threat fails to meet
the constitutional standards established in Gooding v. Wilson
(1972), 405 U. S. 518, 31 L. Ed 2d 408, the Unitid States Supreme
Court's latest statement in this area.

The Court there affinned

its acceptance of the standard established in Chaplinsky v. Xew
Hampshire (1942), 315 U. S. 568, 572, that constitutionally unprotected words are only

1

'those which by their very utterance

inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
405 U. S. at

----

j

31 L. Ed. 2d at 414.

The Court went on to

say at another point, 11 [H]ow infinitely more doubtful and uncertain
are the boundaries of an offense including any 'diversion tending
to a breach of the peace 1
405 U. S. at

____ »

• • •

vv

(Emphasis supplied in Gooding),

31 L. Ed. 2d at 417.

At the very least,

constitutionally unprotected speech must be limited to words
which have a tendency to lead to irrunediate violence or immediate
unlawful activity.
The majority characterizes the words of the appellant
as being a challenge to fight the police.

The majority thus

seems to be saying that these are "fighting words 11 under the
doctrine established in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, suora.
However, the evidence shows that appellant had his back to the
policeman and his statement was not directed at anyone in par~icular.

Sheriff Thrasher testified that he was offended by Hess,
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f

but did not interpret the expression as being directed
personally· at him.
The other apparent basis for the majority's holding
is that appellant's statement was intended to incite further
lawless actions on the part of the crowd.

Under Brandent -1rg
0

the speaker must intend to incite imminent lawless. action and
the words must be likely tO incite imminent lawless action.
Nothing in the record indicates that either of these elements
was present.

In fact, the:re is uncontroverted evidence demon-

strating the opposite.

The evidence shows that .appellant was

not exhorting the crowd and that his statement was not addressed
to any particular person or group.

The record contains no evi-

dence that Sheriff Thrasher felt threatened or considered lawless action to be imminent.

The only evidence is that Sheriff

"Thrasher was offended, and the fact that a police officer is
offended is constitutionally insufficient to support a conviction.

Coates v. City of Cincinnati (1971), 402 U. S. 6il.

Even if it were held that the appellant intended to incite the
crowd, there is still no evidence that lawless action would occur
immediately~ as the people in the crowd did not consider it an
exhortation.

It is clear that neither element of the Branden~urg

test is met.

The evidence ~hows that the phrase was not intended

to incite the crowd, and the evidence does not indicate that
imminent lawless action was likely to result from the speech in
question.

Nor does the phrase used meet the test established

in Gooding v. Wilson
1

the words could not be conside-::ed

'fighting words" and were not likely to lead to immediate

violenceo

There is thus no constitutional basis for appellant's

conviction? and the statute has been unconstitutionally app:ied
to appellant's speech.

-4-

It should also be noted that the Superior Cour~
judge based his finding of guilty upon his conclusion that
appellant's speech would have a "tendency to lead to violence."·
He was apparently basing this on the test established in ½nited.
I do not criticize the judge, because, at that time, Whited was_
the latest statement of the law.

However, as noted he:ceinbefore

a mere tendency to lead to violence is not sufficiently narrow
to prevent intrusion upon constitutionally protected free speech.
Gooding v. Wilson, supra.

The trial judge did not find that the

words would likely lead t:o immediate violence.

If the majority

is merely affirming the finding of the trial judge, they are
affirming an unconstitut:i.onal standard.

If the majority is

holding that the words weire likely to lead to immediate violence
or immediate lawless activity, they are going beyond the finding
of the trial court and making a holding which the record simply
will not support,
The majority attempts to narrow the statute to prevent
problems of vagueness and overbreadth.
A basic prin•ciple of due process is that a st;atute' s
prohibitions be clearly defined.

We assume that persons are

free~ and able to steer between lawful conduct and unlawful conduct.

Laws therefore mus¼ give people of ordinary intelligence

reasonable warning of what actions are proscribed so that they
may act accordingly.

Laws must provide explicit standards in

order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory application of
the law.

A vague law improperly delegates basic policy macters

to policemen» judges~ and juries to be resolved on an ad hoc and
subjective basis with the very real possibility of arbitrary
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application.

Where a statute concerns fundamental First

Amendment rights, there is an additional concern as to whether
a vague statute might tend to inhibit the exercise of those
rights.

Uncertain meanings will often cause citizens to

steer wider of the boundaries of the prohibitions than they .
would if those boundaries were clearly defined.

In thi~ way,

lawful exercise of free speech can be severely dampened.

See

Grayned v. City of Rockfo:rd (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d

222.
Although distinct, the concept of overbreadth is
somewhat related to vagueness in that an overly.broad statute
infringes upon an individual's right to free speech protected
by the First Amendment in much the same way as does a vague
statute.

There are two d:Lfferent problems with an overly broad

statute.

First, it invit,~s arbitrary application by law enforce-

ment officials, and secondly~ it can have the effect of discouraging the exercise of free speech, free movement and assembly.
See» Coates v. City of Cincinnati, supra.
The fact that- the statute on its face might ap?ear overly
broad does not immediately make the statute unconstitutional.
The United States Supreme Court has urged state courts to give
narrowing constructions to ~statutes which might . other\vise invade
protected rights.

See Gooding v. Wilson, supra, 405 U. S. at

31 L. Ed. 2d at 413.

We therefore can narrow the application of

the statute without holding it unconstitutional.
The majority attempts to narrow the statute to prevent
problems of vagueness and overbreadth.

The statute is limited

in the area of pure speech to speech which is so loud as to become a public nuisance~ or speech which has a tendency to lead
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to violence.

I must question whether "causing of loud and

unusual noises~ •. such as to disrupt the peaceful cha-;acter
of the neighborhood to an extent that it becomes a public
nuisance, 11 makes the statute any less vague.

I question

whether this language provides a defendant fair warning of
what actions are proscribed.

One still has no idea what level

of noise is or is not pe:rmissible and also has no idea how the
standard will vary with differing "neighborhoods. 11

If the dis-

orderly conduct statute before us is to also act as an "antinoise11 statutell it must at the very least be restricted to some
specified "neighborhood" such as a school.
of Rockford, supra.

See Grayned v. City

In ~:;rayned, the United States Supreme Court

was faced with the following anti-noise ordinance:
"[N)o person~ while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in which a school or any
class thereof is in session, shall willfully make
or assist in the making of any noise or diversion
which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or
good order of such school session or class thereof
408 U. S. at _ _ , 33 L. Ed 2d at 227.

II

When determining whether this ordinance was vague,
the United States Suprem,~ Court said:
"Although the question is close, we conclude that
the anti-noise ordinance is not impennissibly vague.
The court below rejected appellant's arguments 'that
proscribed conduct was not sufficiently specified and
that police w,~:i;:e given too broad a discretion in
detennining whether conduct was proscribed.'
46 Ill.
2d 492, 494 (1970). Although it referred to other,
similar statutes it had recently construed and upheld, the court beiow did not elaborate on '.::.1e meaning of the anti-noise ordinance.
In this ::,·:..~uat.ion,
as Justice Frankfurter put it, we must 'extrapolate
its allowable meaning. 1 Here, ·we are 'relegated to
the words of the ordinance itseli, 1 to the i.nterpretations the court below has given to analogous
statutes, and, perhaps to sor:·,e c.egree, -co the interpretation of the statute given by those charged with
enforcing it.
'Extrapolation, v of course, is a delicate
task, for it :Ls not within our power to construe and
narrow state laws.
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"With that warning, we find no unconstitutional
vagu2ness in the anti-noise ordinance.
Conc.12::med
to the use of words, we can never expect ma-chematical
certainty from our language. The words
the Rockford ordinance are marked by 'flexibility and re&sonable breadth, rather than mediculous ?ecificity,'
Esteban v. Central Missouri State Co~~ege, 415 F2d
1077, 1088 (CA 8 1969) (Blackrnun, J.), cert den~ed,
398 US 965 (1970), but we think it is clear what
the ordinance as a whole prohibits.
Designed, according to .its preamble, 1 for the protection of Schools,'
the ordinance ±orbids deliberately noisy o= d~versionary
activity which disrup~s or is about to ~~srupt normal
school activities.
It forbids this willful activity
at fixed times -- when school is in session -- and at
a sufficientli fixed place -- 'adjacent' to the school.
Were we left with just the words of the ordinance, we
might be troubled by the imprecision of the phrase
'tends to disturb.' However, in Chicago v. Meyer, 44
Ill 1, 4 (1969), and Chicago v. Gregory, 39 Ill 2d 47
(1968), reversed on other grounds 3S4 US 111, 22 L Ed
2d 134, 89 S Ct 946 (1969), the Supreme Court of Illinois
construed a Chicago ordinance prohibiting, inter alia,
a 'diversion tEmding to disturb the peace,' and held
that it permitted conviction only where there was
1 imminent
threat of violence. '
(Emphas ::..s supp lied.)
See Gregory v. Chicago, 394 US 111, 116-117, 121-122,
22 L Ed 2d 134, 138, 139, 141, 142, 89 S Ct 946 (1969)
(Black, J., concurring).
Since Meyer .was specifically
cited in the opinion below, and it in turn drew heavily
on Gregory, we think it proper to conclude that the·
Supreme Court of Illinois would interpret the Roci(ford
ordinance to prohibit only actual or imminent in..:erference with the 'peace or good order' of the school.

c=

"Although the prohibited quantum of disturbance is not
specified in the ordinance, it is apparent fron the
statute vs announced purpose that the measure is whether
normal school activity has been or is about to be disrupted. We do not have here a vague, gene~al 'breach
of the peace I ordinance, but a specific s ta·.:-...ite :Eor
the school context, where the prohibited disturb2nces
are easily meaE.ured by their impact on t:7.e nor::1al
activities of the school. Given this 'particular
context I the ordinance gives 'fair notice to who:.-, [it]
is directed.' 11
408 U. S. at _ _ _ , 33 L. Ed 2d at
228-230 (emphasis added in final para~
graph)
(Footnotes omitted)
The reason the ordinance was upheld was because i t
was tied directly to schools and was not a general and inadequately
limited breach of the peace statute.

The Court noted trouble with

.
"tends to disturb" but permitted the language because Illinois
will convict only where t:here is an "i.i.-runinent threat of violence."
From a re·ad:Lng of Gooding v. Wilson, supra, and Grayne d v. City
of Rockford, supra, it i~: clear that the majority in the case at .
bar has failed to sufficiently narrow the statute.

The anti-

noise interpretation is both too vague and too broad.

:-:::: does

not sufficiently warn a person what actions are proscribed.

It

invites arbitrary enforcement and infringes upon constitutionally
protected free speech. Since the sheriff arrested appellant for
using offensive language and not because of any threat of violence,
it is clear that the statute was arbitrarily applied by law en. forcement officials in this case.

In both Gooding and Gray-::1ed,

the Court indicated that a mere tendency to lead to violence was
not a sufficient narrowing of a breach of the peace statute.
Subsequent to Gooding v. Wilson, supra, the Supreme Court of the
United States has, in memorandum opinions 1 reversed five cases
with holdings similar to that of the majority.

Gooding was the

fuSC>N

basis for reversal in each instance.
Columbus (1972),
City of New Orleans (1972)~

--- ,

See? c~son v. City of

34 L. Ed 2d 507; Martin v.

---- ~

34 L. Ed 2d 214;

Brown v. Oklahoma (1972), 408 U. S. 914, 33 L. Ed. 2d 326; Lewis
v. City of New Orleans (1972), 408 U. S. 913, 33 L. Ed. 2d 321;
Rosenfeld v. New Jersey (1972), 408 U. S. 901, 33 L. Ed. 2d 321.
In order to avoid arbitrary enforcement and intrusion U?on protected free speech~ such a statute cannot punish pure speech
unless it is likely to lead to imminent lawless action.

As int:er-

preted by the majority~ the disorderly conduct statute remains
both overly vague and overly broad in violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.

.

The majority then asserts that any question as to
the sufficiency of the affidavit has been waived~

The only

apparent basis for this is that the Superior Court judge did
not rule on the appellant's Motion to Quash.

As the majority

note~ the record before the Superior Court judge contained
the following statement:
"The issues raised on this appeal are as follows:
1. Whether the judge of the Circuit Court erred
in overruling defendant's motion to quash the
affidavit • . • . "
Admittedly this was not an "'appeal" as such, but
the State refiled the affidavit in the Superior Court, using
exactly the same words with no amendments, so that it would seem
clear that appellant was continuing his challenge to the sufficiency
of the affidavit.

Other matters in the record unequivocally demon-

strate that appellant intended to be challenging the affidavit by
means of a Motion to Quash.

The record contains the following:

"Prior to the entry of his plea of not guilty
in the City Court, the defendant filed a rr.otion
to quash the affidavit on the ground that it
failed to charge the offense with sufficient
certainty, and on the ground that the disorderly
conduct statut,= (hereinafter cited as Section 101510) is unconstitutional on its face.
A copy of
this motion to quash the affidavit and the suDporting memorandum are attached and made a part of this
record."
(Emphasis added)

The judge neveJ: ruled upon the Motion to Quash, but
simply entered judgment against the appellant on July 19, 1971.
Since the case was tried upon stipulated facts, no hearing was
held in Superior Court.

On July 22~ 1971, appellant filed a

Motion for Clarification of Judgment whic~1. contained the following:
At no time in these proceedings has the State responded substantively to the points made by the
defendant, and neither the City Court nor this Court
has offered any reasons for finding that the St ~tc 1 s
pleading was lE!gally sufficient; that the disorderly
conduct statutEi is constitutional on its face; and
that the said statute was applied constitutionally
in the instant case.
11
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'~he clarification hereby requested is important
to counsel's preparation of a motion to correct
errors and any subsequent appeal that may become
necessary.
"Counsel would welcome the Court's advice as to the
basis upon which this conviction was upheld in light
of the authorities discussed in the memoranda filed
herein and in light of the absence of authority
offered by the Stateor by this Court for sustaining
the convic·t:ion herein. 1 '
(Emphasis added)
The Superior Court judge did not respond to this
motion, and on September 16, 1971, appellant filed his Motion to
Correct Errors which stated in part:
"The Court committed error in overru,ling defendantvs
Motion to Quash the Affidavit for Disorderly Conduct.
The said motion challenged the affidavit on the
grounds that it: did not state the offense with
sufficient certainty; "." ~ 11
No one can doubt that appellant was continuing his

objection to the affidavitp especially in light of the fact that
the words of the affidavit were unchanged when it was refiled.
Appellant made his Motion to Quash a part of the record before
the Superior Court which would seem to me to be substantially
the same as refiling his Notion to Quash.

He followed that by

requesting a ruling on the sufficiency of the pleadings on at
least two occasions.

I am of the opinion. that the question was

properly before the Superi.or Court and is now properly before
this Court.

I would answer" appellant's contention on the merits.
The affidavit in this case is insufficient.

The

initial "multiple choice" affidavit filed in City Court in
Bloomington was as follows:

(See following page)
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D

-cow.m.it the offense of intoxication in public places by being found in a public place and a. pl.a.ce of
public rrsort in a state of intoxication,
·

jv'f act in a loud, boisterous, and disorderly manner so as to disturb the peace and quiet of the (b.o~&-

N

hold) and (neighborhood) in and around the aforementioned pla..ce by loud and unusual noi..::e, -and by
tumultou.s and offensive behavior, threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight a..'1d figb.ti:::g

·u intouch,
beat, and strike the person of one ............ , ......................................... .
a rude, insolent, and angry m.anner,
D

and v{ilfully fail a.nd neglect to furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter, and medical attentio::i to his
minor children (be.ing boys under the age· of 16 Y~arn and girls under the age of 17 years), to wit:
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to furnish such support, .

aa.id defendant being the father thereof and o.h1C'
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forcibly assault, r~sist, oppose, obi;truct, imped~. and interfere with a police officer while such office:-
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contrary .to the form of the statutes in such_ c&~t'8 made anu provided and against the peace and clig::it.y
of the State
Indiana.
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This affidavit would be defective for the sar.,e
reasons that the Uniform Traffic Ticket was held to be
defective in Watt v. State (1968), 249 Ind. 674, 234 K.E. 2d 471.
Appellant~ however, did not attack the affidavit on this basis
and his arguments are equally applicable to both affidavits.

The

affidavit filed in Superior Court, which used the s.sme :anguage

as the initial affidavit, reads as follows:
"The undersigned, being duly sworn on oath, on
information and belief, says that at and in the
County of Monroe and State of Indiana, to-wit:
100 block of South Indiana Avenue, on the 13th
day of May, 1970, one Gregory Hess late of said
County, did then and there unlawfully act in a
loud, boisterous and disorderly manner so as to
disturb the peace and quiet of the household and
neighborhood in and around the aforementio~ed
place by loud and unusual noise, and by tu...uultuous
and offensive behavior, threatening, traducingj
quarreling, challenging to fight and fighting
contrary to the, form of the statutes in such cases
made and provided and against the peace and dignity
of the State of Indiana."
An accused has a constitutional right to be given .
adequate notice of the charges against him.
Constitution of Indianao

Art. l

§13,

In Taylor v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 415,

418P 140 N. E. 2d 104, 1P6~ this Court stated:
[I] t is the WE:11 established rule in this state
that the particular crime with_which the defendant
is charged must be shown with such reasonable
certainty, by express averments as will enable
the court and jury to distinctly understand w':--i.at
is to be tried and determined, and to fully infonn the defendant of the particular charge which
he is required to meet. The averments must be so
clear and distinct that there may be no difficulty
in determining what evidence is admissible thereunder. 11
11

In Loveless v. State (1960), 240 Ind. 534~ 539~ 166

N.E. 2d 864, 866, Chief Justice Arterburn stated:
[A] defendant is entitled to be informed SDo2cifically
of the crimes charged and not come to -crial in th-2
dark at).d uninformed as to the natu~e of the evidence
to be presented against him.n
(Emphasis added)
11

-13-

Ordinarily an affidavit is sufficient if it follows
the words of the statute defining the crime.

However,

j__~

the

crime is defined in general terms, the affidavit or i~dictr:~ent
must specify the particular acts which were done by the accused.
McNamara v. State (1932), 203 Ind. ~96, 181 N.E. 512.

There

can be little doubt that the disorderly conduct statute defines
the crime in general terms.

7~~.e s·to.tute can be read to define

at least forty-eight different offenses. 1

Upon reading the affi-

davit it appears that appellant was charged with corr...'Tiitting all
forty~eight variations of the crime of disorderly conduct.

How-

ever~ there is absolutely no description of the . acts which constituted this amazing feat:.
behavior was tumultuous.
he fight?

One must ask whether appellant's

Did he traduce?

Did he quarrel?

Did

One might say he did disturb some unnamed neighborhood,

but who was the family he disturbed?
Appellant was arrested for saying the word "fuck" and
so he probably assumed that this would be the act he would have
to defend against.

In the: course of both trials, the appellant

sought a clarification of exactly what the State thought were
the acts he committed which constituted the offense.

Finally:i

after both trials were completed and appellant had filed his
Motion to Correct Errors, the Superior Court judge stated that
,.

the phrase, "We'll take the fucking street later [or again],"
had

11

a tendency to lead to violence" regardless of the foul

language.

To discover the basis for the prosecution only after.

the trial is completed is both unfair and unconstitutional.
Appellant 1 s conduct has been admitted by all to constitute pure speech.

We had previously held in Whited that for

pure speech to be disorderly conduct it had to have a tendency

-14-

to lead to violence.

Thus, in appellant's case the allegation

th at his wo rd s would have a tendency to lead to violence would
be an essential element of. the cr1.m·e.

An accused has the right

to have all the essential elements of the offense charged in
the affidavit.

McCormick v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 281, 119 N.E.

2d 5; Borton v. State (1952), 230 Ind. 679, 106 N.E. 2d 392.

The affidavit before us is th2~0~~re defective and subject to a
Motion to Quash for failure to state all the essential elements
of the crime.

On the basis of the objections to the affidavit alone,
the cause should be reversed and remanded with proper limiting
'

standards placed upon the statute.
In conclusion, although I might find oth~r limiting
standards more reasonable, it seems to me we shou+d feel compelled
to . apply the minimum constitutional standards established by the
Supreme Court of the United Stat.es.

We should not stretch the

(

facts beyond those in the record to fit some nebulous standard
0

which will not meet constitutional muster.

Even if the majority

does not hold that the evidence requires a reversal~ it should
at·least narrow the statute within the constitutional guidelines
e·stablished by the Supreme Court of the United States.

1. This may be illustrated by taking all the
disjoined words in the statements of the elements
of disorderly conduct and substituting them in
sequenceo
I

(manner)

1.

Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud

20
3.

4.
5.
6.

I I (disturb peace and quiet of)

III (by)

.c:
• 1y
J..am1.
family
neighborhood
neighborhood
family
neighborhood

lo--..:d noise

unusual noise
loud noise
unusual noise
tumultuous behavior
tumultuous behavior
-15-

(Continuation of footnote)

7.
8.

10.
11.
12.
13.

Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud
Loud

family
neighborhood
family
neighborhood
family
neighborhood
family

14.

Loud

neighborhood

15.
16.

Loud
Loud

family
neighborhood

9.

offensive
offensive
offensive
~offensive
offensive
offensive
offensive

behavior
behavior
behavior
behavior
behavior
behavior
behavior

(threatening)
(threatening)
(traducing)
(traducing)
(quarreling)
(quarreling)
(challenging
to fight)
offensive behavior (challenging
to fight)
offensive behavior (fighting)
offensive behavior (fighting)

If "boisterous" and "disorderly" are substituted
for "loud," forty-eight combinations will appear.

-16-
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GREGORY HESS,
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STATE OF INDIANA,
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PRENTICE~ J.

-

)
)
)·
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 1271 S 372

Concurring.

Although I dissented in the case of Whited v. State

(1971)

p

_

Ind.

_P

269 N.E. 2d 149 v. my dissatisfaction

therein was not with the statement of the law by the majority
but rather with its application to the facts of that particular case.

In the case a; bar, the evidence discloses to me

that the conduct of the appellant was illegal, as tested by
the standards of that case and also by the nclear and present
danger" test of Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), 395 U.S. 444~ 89
S. Ct. 1827P 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 and Terminiello v. Chicago
(1949)~ 337 U.S. 1 9 69 S. Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed. 1131 and the
"immediate threat" test of the most recent case of Gooding v.
Wilson (1972)» _ U . S . _ , 31 L. Ed. 2d 408.

The acts or

words complained of must be viewed within the context of the
circumstances that surrounde!d them.

nThe probable and natural

consequences of the conduct is the important element."
Whited v. State (Dissenting Opinion.
· ·
) suura, citing State v.
Korich (1~49), 219 Minn. 268, 17 N.W. 2d 497.

The crowd was

volatile and the police officers under stress.
11

Thus, when a policeman.is in the p:coper
performance of his duty and another by conduct
set forth in the statute and which is calculated
to be, or is reasonab:!..y likely to be offensive
to him, such conduct would be disorderly within
the intent of the statute, if it is probable and
natural that the consequences will be to divert
or interfere with or limit his effective functioning and thereby create, contribute to, or
foster the continuance of a disturbance to the
peace and quiet of any neighborhood or family.
· . While it is to be hoped that, among other
desirable qualities, our policemen will have
an extraordinarily high degree of emotional
stability, we nevertheless are not justified
in presuming such. We will remember that they
labor under difficult and often exasperating
circumstances, and we cannot ascribe to them
a tolerance or boiling point higher than that
of the ordinary man.
Further, we have a right
to expect him to be professionally competent
and will presume him to be so.
Therefore, if
he clearly oversteps the boundaries of proper
police action, he will be presumed to have
done so with knowledge of the same and a
•Wilful disregard of the rights and sensitivity
of the 2.ssailed. · Under such circumstances:. he
· is the offender, is entitled to no greater
degree of civility than any other person and
·. responsible for the probable and natural consequences.
This is not to say that every
·miscue of a policeman will justify provocative
conduct oy the person thereby offended or in"'.'
convenienced.
The tests are whether or not
·. the action which provoked the assault was»
•under the circumstances, such as would be
acceptable of a professionally competent
• policem&n, and whether or not such action~
under the circumstances, would incite the
anger of a person of ordinary emotional
stability.
If the answer to the first question is 'No' while the answer to the second
is 'Yes', the probable and natural consequences will be held to be the conduct of
the policeman.
If~ however, the answer to
. the first question is 'Yes' or if the answer
to the second question is 'No', the policeman's action will not be held to justify
conduct calculated to be, or reasonably
likely to be offensive to him or to incite
others to be offensive to him."
Whited v. State (Di::isenting Opinion) supra~
269 N.E. 2d at 155.
- 2

As to the majority's view, as written by Justice
Givan, I believe that a trial de novo is not a review of
the proce~dings had before the lower court, but there is
yet another reason to deny relief upon the . issue of the
sufficiency of the affidavit.

Even if, as urged by Appel-

lant, the motion to quash was before the trial judge, he
did not rule upon it; and we cannot assume that it was
considered and overruled.

By proceeding without a ruling ·

and without protestj Appellant waived any erro;: that might
otherwise have been averted.
Chustak et al. v. Northern Indiana Public
Service Co. (1.972) ~ _
Ind. _))
288 N.E. 2d 149;
Barnes v. State (1971),
266 N.E. 2d 617;
Wilhoite v. St~ (1971),
266 N.E. 2d 23;
Brown v. State (1970)~
262 N.E. 2d 515.
DeBRULERj J. concurs.
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